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THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN PREVENTION AND
COMPENSATION OF HIP FRACTURES AMONG
ELDERLY CITIZENS: THE LAW'S ROLE IN CREATING
EX ANTE INCENTIVES
Janis Sarra*
Hip fractures due to falls are a significant contributor to
mortality and morbidity among the elderly in Canada. Lord and
Clark have reported that falls pose a major threat to the well-
being and quality of life of older people, with approximately one
third of all people aged sixty-five and over suffering at least one
fall per year.' Braun estimates eleven percent of these falls result
in significant injury to elderly people, including a sizable
number of hip fractures. 2 Kannus reports that worldwide over
eight million low-trauma fractures occur annually among
individuals that are aged sixty years and older, and twenty
percent or 1.6 million of those fractures are hip fractures.3 In
addition to demographic changes that are likely to result in a
huge increase in hip fractures in the next two decades, medical
scholars suggest that the age-standardized incidence (individual
risk of fracture) is increasing.4 It is estimated that annual cost
implications of hip fractures in Canada are $650 million, and by
2041 the annual cost implications are expected to rise to $2.4
billion.'
'Janis Sarra is Assistant Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,
at the University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada. Sarra thanks
UBC Law students Danielle Park and Sarah Jones for assisting with
literature search and footnote assistance.
1. Stephen R. Lord & Russell D. Clark, Simple Physiological and Clinical Tests for
Accurate Prediction of Falling in Older People, 42 GERONTOLOGY 199-203 (1996).
2. Julie A. Braun & Elizabeth A. Capezuti, The Legal and Medical Aspects of
Physical Restraints and Bed Siderails and their Relationship to Falls and Fall-Related
Injuries in Nursing Homes, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 5 (2000).
3. See generally Pekka Kannus, Karim Khan, Seppo Niemi et al, Perspective, Why
is the Age-Standardized Incidence of Low-Trauma Fractures Rising in Many Elderly
Populations?, 17 J. OF BONE AND MINERAL RESEARCH 1363 (2002).
4. Id.
5. See generally Mary Wiktorowicz et al, Economic Cost Implications of Hip
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Hip fractures are primarily attributed to falls, and the falls
are due to a complex myriad of factors including impaired
cognition, unsafe housing and institutional practices, unsafe
footwear practices, impairments of posture, compromised bone
strength, nutrition, lifestyle and environmental factors, as well
as additional factors that have not been identified or
documented empirically.6 Julie Braun and Elizabeth Capezuti
have reported that most elderly falls are due to what they call
intrinsic factors such as health problems, frailty and sensory
deficits. There are also extrinsic factors such as environmental
factors and new demands on health and social services that play
a part in elderly falls. Therefore, an individualized multi-
factorial intervention is the best strategy to reduce falls.7 Pekka
Kannus and Karim Kahn have observed that low-trauma
fractures of older adults are major public health burdens that
involve economic costs, diminished health and well-being of
elderly people, and social and psychological effects from
reduced autonomy and quality of life.' Prevention programs
identify the risks associated with the individual, and then they
create strategies that focus on prevention based on the particular
risks. McIntyre and Freeman have suggested that patient-focus-
care is the best strategy to enhance the quality of life of nursing
home residents. Patient-focus-care can also prevent harm to
nursing home residents through accommodations of medical
and social needs instead of restraints or mandatory program
participation that reduce autonomy and restrain the individual's
behaviour.9 In order to best design prevention strategies, there
is a need for more research on the complex factors contributing
to the increased risk of hip fractures.
One aspect of this discussion of risk factors in hip fractures
is whether the legal system creates particular ex ante incentive
effects that contribute to or mitigate the incidence of falls and/or
hip fractures. This article begins an exploration of whether there
are incentives within the legal system that can be tailored to
fracture: Health Service Use, Institutional Care and Cost in Canada, 12 OSTEOPOROSIS
INT'L 271 (2001).
6. Lord & Clark, supra note 1; Kannus et al, supra note 3.
7. Braun & Capezuti, supra note 2. Julie A. Braun & Elizabeth A. Capezuti, A
Medic-Legal Evaluation of Dehydration and Malnutrition Among Nursing Home
Residents, 8 ELDER L.J. 239, 270 (2000).
8. Kannus et al, supra note 3, at 1364.
9. Moira McIntyre & Peter Freeman, Workshop Presentation on Aging and
Nursing Homes (June 2, 2003), Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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increase the implementation of measures designed to prevent
hip fractures. The first part of this inquiry discusses the extent
to which the legal system currently creates ex ante incentives to
prevent hip fractures, including any factors currently
unrecognized by the legal regime. It explores the limits of the
current liability regime and its disjunction with prevention
goals. The second part raises some very preliminary questions
regarding a future research agenda to explore how to create new
legal incentives for prevention of hip fractures, which may
complement preventive strategies in the health, socio-economic,
and public policy spheres.
When one begins to consider the relationship between the
legal system and hip fractures, the obvious incentive effects
appear to arise from the statutory liability and tort regimes.
Statutes extend liability for individuals in hospitals, nursing
homes and other assisted living facilities. One question is
whether the statutory framework of protection, as currently
constructed, provides sufficient incentive to prevent hip
fractures. Does the liability regime really just encourage
narrowly constructed risk management strategies, physical
restraints and other strategies, instead of looking at longer term
and more systemic solutions? In this respect, the issues differ in
Canada and the United States where civil liability is much more
pronounced and tort liability chill is a driving factor in many
legal prevention strategies. The more private and litigious
nature of the U.S. health care regime has caused most legal
literature regarding health outcomes, prevention, and legal
liability to emanate from the United States. One issue is whether
there are different liability effects and different incentive effects
in the Canadian system, where health care is a greater mix of
public and private services.
For elderly individuals living on their own, a further issue is
what incentives the legal system creates, if any, for home care
professionals, public health officials, store owners, and others to
identify and eliminate hazards. In this respect, occupiers'
liability legislation and professional licensing standards have
been aimed at defining the nature and scope of the duty of care.
One question is whether codification of these relationships
creates particular incentives to prevent falls and hip fractures, or
whether they have an opposite effect. Does the legal system
need to create incentives for individuals, in terms of prevention,
or is this a function of better education and support measures?
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Most of these questions require further empirical study, and
this article is a starting point in the discussion. It is premised on
the fact that many of the incentives to reduce hip fractures are
non-legal. Therefore, the development of any prevention
strategy within the legal system need to be aligned with heath
care, home care and multiple other strategies for the elderly,
including addressing the more serious systemic problem of
poverty among elderly individuals.
FALLS AND HIP FRACTURES: LEGAL RISKS IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SETTINGS
In Canada, provincial and federal government support for
health care and other services for elderly individuals implicate
legislative and regulatory standards, public funding and budget
allocations at the macro-political level and at the operational
level. Legislative standards also reflect somewhat the dominant
normative views about society's obligation to create safe and
healthy living conditions for older citizens. Public policies
interact with legally imposed constraints on conduct and these
affect the quality of life of older people, including, arguably,
their safety, well being and risk of falls in the particular settings
in which they live. Health policies aimed at de-
institutionalization, devolution of caregiving to private
enterprises or cost cutting measures in terms of the ratio of
health care professionals to patients/clients may result in savings
to the tax base in the short-term, but will likely increase the risk
of falls and hip fractures.
The long-term costs of health care from failing to set legal
standards that reduce the risk of falls and the social costs of the
resulting morbidity and mortality from falls are inadequately
accounted for in setting legal and regulatory standards. Rather,
these long-term costs are frequently treated as externalities in
the health care system. The costs exist, but they are borne by the
older individuals who suffer from the health, social, and other
effects associated with falls and hip fractures. In other cases,
legislative decisions regarding funding the costs of health care
are accounted for in the costing of hip fractures. However, the
loss of an individual's independence, mobility, and dignity are
not accounted for in public costing, rather they are costs borne
by the individual, individual's family, and sometimes
community members.
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In Ontario, British Columbia and other Canadian provinces,
the shift towards de-institutionalization arguably creates a
particular incentive effect in respect to hip fractures. Ironically,
since the mid-1960's, advocates for increased public health and
adverse health outcome prevention have argued for increased
emphasis on public health, home care supports, and reform to
the health care system based on community based services. In
principle, such programs are aimed at helping foster or preserve
independence for the elderly and at allowing the community
voice in the provision of services. For governments, the appeal
was that preventive and community-based approaches were less
costly and more patient focused.o
Yet the closure of hospital beds, the under-funding of
chronic care facilities and the move to more profit-based services
in the long-term care area were not accompanied by adequate
funding of home care and other initiatives genuinely aimed at
real support to the elderly in their homes. As a consequence,
legislative choices aimed at prevention and patient-focused care
may have increased the risk of falls in the elderly population. It
is also estimated that a considerable percentage of those with hip
fractures have a repeat fall and are re-institutionalized.11
CANADA AND THE "LIABILITY CHILL"
It is difficult to disentangle liability fear, safety concern and
injury risk for older people. In any setting where others are
responsible for the daily care or living standards of the elderly,
there is a duty of care, and consequently, the potential for
liability arising from breach of that duty. Legal scholars have
observed that many policy discussions regarding health care
reform and notions of the public interest are tempered by
professionals' self-interest, whether it is the cost of the reforms
or promotion of best practices.12
Flood has suggested that what is ostensibly in the public
interest is not necessarily in the patient's interest, given that
professionals may be co-opted by government initiatives that
10. NAT'L F. ON HEALTH, VOL. II, Values Working Group Synthesis Report, in
CANADA HEALTH ACTION: BUILDING ON THE LEGACY (National Forum on Health
1997).
11. Braun & Capezuti, supra note 2.
12. Colleen Flood, Conflicts between Professional Interests, the Public Interest and
Patient's Interests in an Era of Reform, 5 HEALTH L.J. 27 (1997).
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shift the burden of health care from the health care providers to
individuals in order to bring provincial budgets under control.'3
More recently, Canadian health law scholars have expressed
concern that one outcome of NAFTA and other free trade
initiatives is that Canadians may have increased the risk of
creating a two-tier health care system based on ability to pay for
services and supports.'4 Even with enshrined protections for
health services maintained for a public purpose in NAFTA, Epps
and Flood have suggested that the liberalization of trade may
create pressures on the Canadian health system that could shift
the balance away from a comprehensively funded health care
system. 5 Canada is also experiencing some shift to U.S. style
managed care, raising new issues of contractual risk allocation
for elderly caregiving. Because more comprehensive health care
is not available, trade liberalization, growing privatization, and
shifts away from comprehensive health programs may create
new incentives to pursue litigation, including claims for
compensation from falls.
Nursing home residents are increasingly older, causing
individuals entering nursing homes to have more health
problems. In turn, this poses new challenges for patient-centred
care. Choices by private health care providers to contain costs
and maximize profit, such as enrolling lower risk individuals
(leaving those at higher risk without care), or other cost control
measures that are current practices, also have incentive affects.16
Thus, the standards required of publicly regulated but privately
operated health care, assisted living, and other facilities have an
impact on the quality of the elderly person's life, and on the risk
of falls and injury.
The impact is a shift in the liability risk of falls from the
public to private domain. Thus, there is a growing societal wish
to remain in the home or in living situations in which autonomy
is preserved, and yet the risk factors associated with this
increased autonomy have not been adequately explored. There
is also a connection to the incentive effect of living alone. The
decreased availability of long-term care coupled with a growing
13. Id.
14. Tracy Epps & Colleen Flood, Have We Traded Away the Opportunity for
Innovative Health Care Reform? The Implications of the NAFTA for Medicare, 47 MCGiLL
L.J. 747, 747 (2002).
15. Id. at 762, 766.
16. Flood, supra note 12, at 40.
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elderly population has resulted in increasing numbers of elderly
individuals who are living with little or no assistance. Statistics
Canada estimates that more than fifty percent of women over
age sixty-five live in a low-income situation.17 Low income
frequently means that eye care goes unchecked or that
individuals do not seek health care assistance for problems of
balance or diet, contributing to falls and fractures. Shifting
demographics suggests that older people are living longer in
their homes, yet there is decreasing availability of traditional
family support structures. There are inadequate home care
services in place that would identify risks in the home or the
elderly person's daily life routine that could reduce risk and
prevent falls. Poverty means that the elderly will have to take
public transit or walk instead of using taxicabs during icy winter
days, which increases the risk of falls.
Poverty among the elderly is a legal as well as a political
public policy choice. These legal and policy constraints
determine the extent to which pay equity, employment equity,
human rights, public pensions and other laws influence the
ability of individuals to earn incomes during their working lives
and/or the public assistance available during their retirement.
These legislative choices determine individuals' living and
health choices when they are older. The strength of pension law
and protections, and the extent to which bankruptcy laws allow
the elderly to keep their retirement savings, all contribute to the
conditions under which older individuals will live, and it
indirectly affects the risk factors they may face. The shift, for
example, from defined benefit pension plans to defined
contribution pension plans is shifting the risk of ensuring an
adequate retirement income from the employers to individuals
in terms of the outcomes of investment strategies of fund
managers. Combined with stock losses from fluctuating
securities markets and inadequate securities law protection for
smaller investors, this will contribute to longer-term poverty for
older persons and perhaps exacerbate the risks discussed here.18
17. STATISTICS CANADA, A PORTRAIT OF SENIORS IN CANADA 9 (2d ed.,
Statistics Canada 1997). Margaret Shone estimates that 2/5 of Canadians live in
poverty, that number rising to 2/3 for unattached individuals. Margaret Shone,
Health, Poverty and the Elderly: Can the Courts Make a Difference? 24 ALTA L. REV. 839,
839 (1991).
18. An example would be the scandal involving the Enron Corporation in the
United States, where older employees lost not only their jobs but all their pension
saving because these were invested almost entirely in Enron stock.
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Thus, the choice of laws, budget allocations, determinations of
responsibility and liability, all influence the extent to which we
as a society are prepared to truly prevent hip fractures.
Similarly, preventive and public health programs have
resulted in increasingly longer life expectancy, but may have
created additional risks of falls given that individuals are living
longer and thus are more likely to be in the highest risk
categories for falls and hip fractures. It is the linkages between
many of these factors and the legal system that is under-
explored and which should be the subject of future study.
OCCUPIERS' LIABILITY AND INCENTIVE EFFECTS TO PREVENT
INJURY TO THE ELDERLY
A number of falls and hip fractures among the elderly occur in
stores, parking lots and public sidewalks. A canvass of recent
judicial decisions on liability indicates that many of these cases
involve falls on ice and wet floors in retail shopping facilities.
Canada has codified how liability is to be attributed in such
circumstances, providing at least some legal incentives to make
premises safer and to prevent falls through codified standards of
liability. In most Canadian provinces, the duty of care in respect
of these types of falls is defined under the various Occupiers'
Liability Acts, which set standards for safe premises and impose
duties on those occupying stores, residential facilities and other
businesses.19 An "occupier" includes a person in physical
possession of premises who has responsibility for or control over
the condition of the premises or activities carried on the
premises.20
Sections 2 and 3(1) of the Ontario Occupiers' Liability Act
specify:
2. Subject to section 9, this Act applies in place of the
rules of the common law that determine the care that
the occupier of premises at common law is required to
show for the purpose of determining the occupier's
liability in law in respect of dangers to persons entering
19. See, e.g., Occupiers' Liability Act, Revised Statutes of Ontario, c. 0.2
(Ontario 1990); Occupiers' Liability Act, Revised Statutes of British Columbia, c. 337
(British Columbia 1996); The Occupiers Liability Act, C.C.S.M., c. 08 (Manitoba).
20. Occupiers' Liability Act, § 1, Revised Statutes of Ontario, c. 0.2 (Ontario
1990).
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on the premises or the property brought on the
premises by those persons.
3(1) An occupier of premises owes a duty to take such
care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable
to see that persons entering on the premises, and the
property brought on the premises by those persons are
reasonably safe while on the premises.
The statute then tempers that liability by specifying that
liability does not apply in respect of risks willingly assumed by
the person entering the premises.2 1 Section 4(1) specifies that
even where an individual willingly assumes the risk, the
occupier still owes a duty to the person to not create a danger
with the deliberate intent of doing harm and a duty to not act
with reckless disregard. There are two aspects to legal
incentives under occupiers' liability legislation (1) the duty to
take care and to make premises reasonably safe; and (2) the
defense to liability from those who "willingly assume" risk.
How the courts have interpreted these provisions delimits the
scope of liability and also creates structural incentives to create
safe premises aimed at preventing the risk of falls.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that under the
Occupiers' Liability Act, the occupiers have an affirmative duty to
make the premises reasonably safe for persons entering by
taking reasonable care to protect such persons from foreseeable
harm.22 The duty is not absolute and occupiers are not always
liable for any damages suffered by persons entering their
premises. Their responsibility is to take such care as in all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable.23 The Supreme Court
held that the Occupiers' Liability Act was enacted to replace,
refine, and harmonize the common law duty of care owed by
occupiers of premises to visitors on those premises. 24 However,
the court held that this statutory codification was not intended
to effect a wholesale displacement of common law defenses to
21. Id. § 4(1). Section 9(3) specifies that the Negligence Act still applies.
22. Waldick v. Malcolm, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456 (Can. 1991).
23. Mr. Justice Blair, Ontario Court of Appeal judgment in Waldick v. Malcom,
70 O.R. (2d) 717, 723 (Can. 1991), affirmed Waldick v. Malcolm, 2 S.C.R. 456 (Can.
1991).
24. Waldick, supra note 22, at 140.
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liability.25 In examining the nature and extent of the duty of care
under occupiers' liability legislation in Canada, the court held
that while the standard of reasonableness does not change, the
factors that are relevant to an assessment of what constitutes
reasonable care will be specific to each fact situation.26 The
Supreme Court also held that the existence of customary local
practices which are unreasonable in themselves or which are not
otherwise acceptable to the courts, does not oust the duty of care
owed by occupiers under the statute.
In terms of a defense under the statute, the Supreme Court
of Canada has held that the statute carves out only a very
narrow exception to the class of visitors to whom the occupiers'
statutory duty of care is owed, similar to the doctrine of volenti,
that the individual assumes the risk and absolves the occupier of
all responsibility.2 7 It found that the standard is greater than
sciens (mere knowing) and requires the application of the maxim
volenti non fit injuria (knowledge of the risk and consent or
waiver of legal rights that may arise from harm that is being
risked).28 The Court held that the premise underlying the volenti
doctrine is "that no wrong is done to one who consents." 29 The
requirement that the defense requires a positive agreement to
waive the right of action has been subsequently endorsed by
courts across Canada, including a requirement to establish that
the individual assumed both the physical and legal risk
involved. 0
Recent judicial decisions under occupiers' liability statutes
indicate several trends. At times, it is difficult to establish that
the occupier breached its duty of care with older plaintiffs. For
example, in a recent Manitoba Court of Appeal case, an eighty-
four year old woman had slipped entering a grocery store and
fractured her hip. The court dismissed her appeal that the store
had breached its duty of care owed to her by failing to
25. Id.
26. Id. T[ 33. See also Warren v. Cadith Entertainments Ltd., Ontario No. 885
(Can. Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.) 1994), where a Bingo Hall was found liable for failure to
see that a seventy-six year old woman who fell on a ridge of the defendant's floor
and fractured her hip was reasonably safe while on its premises.
27. See, e.g., § 4(1) of the Occupiers' Liability Act, Revised Statutes of Ontario, c.
0.2 (Ontario 1990).
28. Waldick, supra note 22, at [ 38.
29. Id. 1 48.
30. See, e.g., Marchand v. New Westminster School District, B.C.J. No. 2889
(Can. B.C.S.C. 1997); Bains v. Hill, 68 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (Can. B.C.C.A. 1992).
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reasonably maintain the condition of its store to ensure her
safety.31 The court found that the store had placed a small sign
that gave notice of danger from slipperiness. The plaintiff fell
taking a first step off of a carpet onto the tile floor of the store. A
second carpet had been placed there but at a distance beyond
which the plaintiff would be able to reach on her first step. In
dismissing the claim, the trial court held that (1) the warning
sign was sufficient; (2) the plaintiff had contributed to the slush
on the floor when she entered; (3) the amount of water on the
floor was not excessive; and (4) it was unreasonable to expect the
store to either vacuum up the water more regularly, provide
additional floor mats when floors were slippery or utilize a
dryer to supplement the mopping.32 The Court of Appeal upheld
the trial judgment, finding that the store had discharged its duty
of care. There is no discussion about the costs of additional mats
or staff as opposed to the social costs of loss of quality of her life
after the fall and fracture. This highlights the discounting effect
that occurs in regard to the elderly. Falls and hip fractures in
grocery stores appear from the number of court decisions on
such claims to be one of the more common cases where claims
are brought under occupiers' liability legislation.33 By setting a
low standard for "reasonable care," one outcome may be an
increase in falls from slippery premises because occupiers will
not fear liability challenges for unsafe premises.
THE "ELDERLY COMPENSATION DISCOUNT" AND ITS INCENTIVE
EFFECTS
Cases of alleged breach of duty under occupiers' liability
legislation involving falls of elderly individuals and resulting
hip fractures indicate that the court engages in a two-part
inquiry. First, did the defendant take reasonable care to see that
the parking lot or other venue of the fall was reasonably safe?4
Second, did the plaintiff willingly accept the risk? The British
31. Nikkel v. Westfair Foods Ltd. (c.o.b. Extra Foods), M.J. No. 100 (Can. Man.
C.A., 2003).
32. Id., 14.
33. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hicks Enterprises Ltd., B.C.J. No. 3059 (Can. B.C.S.C.
1991); Snelgrove v. Steinberg Inc., O.J. No. 2826 (Can. Ont. C.A. 1995) where a
seventy-seven year old woman fell in the produce section from moisture on the
floor and fractured her hip.




Columbia statute uses the language "willingly accept" the risk,
and the Ontario statute uses the language "willingly assume"
the risk. In both jurisdictions the courts have found that this
requires some sort of affirmative acceptance, not just proceeding
in the face of the knowledge of the risks.35 This does assist in
ensuring that claims for damages from hip fractures are not
dismissed on the outset on the basis that the individual assumed
the risk by entering the store or parking lot.
Where issues of occupiers' liability are litigious, there is
sometimes a further challenge by defendant that pre-existing
disease or health of the complainant was a precondition to a
future fall or had already diminished quality of life such that the
plaintiff should receive fewer damages. 36 Courts have observed
that it is difficult to separate pain, suffering, and loss of
enjoyment that is due to a fall from that which comes from
aging.37 While the duty of care is cast fairly highly, the measure
of social and economic costs of the fracture from the fall are
discounted for the elderly.
A number of the reported court decisions involve falls in icy
parking lots, perhaps a quintessentially Canadian risk.38 While
not all of these cases involved elderly individuals, a sizable
number do, and the long-term effects of such falls and hip
fractures are now well established." For the store, hospital or
commercial enterprise, the cost considerations are the cost of
employing individuals, equipment and supplies to de-ice, versus
the probability of a fall, that the customer or client will
complain, the risk that they will pursue legal remedies, and that
the defendant will be unable to establish a defense of reasonable
care. Moreover, insurance coverage can be purchased, and
absent an increase in premium costs from successful actions,
35. Id. at 10, citing also Waldick. v. Malcolm, 61 0.R. (2d) 624 (Can. Ont. S.C.
1987) at the trial level (see references to S.C.C. judgment in this case).
36. Id., see discussion at 11-13.
37. Volk v. F.W. Woolworth Co., B.C.J. No. 2350 (Can. B.C.S.C. 1992).
38. Goldsmith v. Callaghan Construction Co, B.C.J. No. 908 (Can. B.C.S.C.
1988). Gardiner v. Thunder Bay Regional Hospital O.J. No. 833 (Can. Ont. C.J.
(Gen. Div.) 1999); Kopen v. 61345 Manitoba Ltd., M.J. No. 122 (Can. Man. Q.B.
1992); Stevenson v. City of Winnipeg Housing Co., M.J. No. 588 (Can. Man. Q. B.
1988); Britt v. Zagjo Holdings Ltd., O.J. No. 1014 (Can. Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.) 1996);
Baker v. Rupert Acres, O.J. No. 363 (Can. Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.) 1997); Sheikhani v.
Ontario (Niagara Parks Commission), O.J. No. 880 (Can. Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.) 1998);
Moulton v. Whitehorse (City), Y.J. No. 161 (Can. Y.T.S.C. 1993).
39. Johnston and Johnston v. Standard Life Assurance Co., 73 OR. (2d) 495
(Can. Ont. C.J. 1990).
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decision makers responsible for prevention of falls in their
operations can be insulated from suffering the full impact of
their cost benefit decisions on de-icing and other prevention
measures. These circumstances inescapably raise the question of
how do we begin to approach more systemic preventive
strategies.
Several court judgments involve hip fractures and elderly
individuals falling from deteriorating sidewalks because
municipal authorities failed to maintain public sidewalks and
paths.40 It may be that there are different considerations in
creating incentives for prevention of falls among public
authorities as the costs of compensation from liability are not
borne by the individuals making the decisions not to repair or
de-ice the sidewalks, and they will likely be implementing
policy choices driven by budget decisions of elected officials.
Cases that analyze damages also provide evidence of the
reduced quality of life and of independence of the person who
fell and suffered a hip fracture. There is also some indication of
the complications that occur from original hip injuries and
consequent reduced economic security. Claims under the Family
Law Act, where family members seek compensation for time and
care provided, also indicate how the burden of these falls and
fractures are also borne by family members.4' Other scholars
have observed that one of the main hurdles to effective
prevention and compensation for elderly people is the existence
of inadequate legal remedies that would create some positive
incentive effects in reducing harm.42
Since most complaints of injuries are never acted on, when
official complaints are filed, only about one percent ever make it
through the court system to trial and disposition. Thus the true
effects of falls and fractures and implications of the legal system
40. Winkler v. Vaughan (Town), O.J. No. 573 (Can. Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.) 1992).
41. Id 1 1; see also, e.g.,Warren v. Cadith Entertainments Ltd., O.J. No. 885 (Can.
Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.) 1994). Family law legislation in some provinces allows claims
for services in assisting a family member recover from a hip fracture or other injury;
see, e.g., Family Law Reform Act, Revised Statutes of Ontario, c. 152, s.60 (Ontario
1980).
42. Suzanne Levitt & Rebecca O'Neill, A Call for a Functional Multidisciplinary
Approach to Intervention in Cases of Elder Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation: One Legal
Clinic's Experience 5 ELDER L.J. 195, 195 (1997). They suggest that in the U.S. there
are three main hurdles to effective intervention by legal advocates on behalf of
elderly clients: access to essential services, inadequate legal remedies and




are unknown. However, it is clear that precedent in assigning
legal responsibility has some influence on the behaviour of those
in a position to ameliorate some of the risk factors that create
falls. Current legislated standards create incentive effects for
occupiers. They weigh the costs of maintenance of anti-fall
strategies such as adequate staff to ensure slippery areas are
cleaned up and the cost of sanding icy parking lots, against the
risk that an elderly person who falls will understand that they
may have a remedy, that they can establish both a duty of care
and breach of that duty, and that they have the information,
resources and stamina to pursue a claim. The extent of these
incentive effects and whether they create the wrong incentives
requires further study and consideration.
INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL CARE MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS
Institutional care settings include a range of facilities from
homes for the aged, nursing homes, and hospital wards. Lord
and Clark report that the incidence of falls for the elderly in
institutional care settings, including nursing homes and
intermediate care facilities, are even higher than in the
community, over fifty percent of all people aged sixty-five and
older fall at least one time per year.43  Falls also generally
increase the risk of older people being admitted to nursing
homes." Moreover, there is some evidence that staff shortages
in institutional settings may contribute to falls from lack of staff
to properly lift patients, inadequate staffing to properly detect
malnutrition and dehydration, and inability to monitor at-risk
patients.45
In the nursing home setting, falls and fall-related injuries
are the leading cause of lawsuits launched against nursing
homes in the United States.46 Julie Braun and Elizabeth Capezuti
have observed that, historically, introduction of bed siderails
and physical restraints were a risk-management strategy, aimed
at reducing or preventing falls and also aimed at preventing fall-
related litigation. 47 The prevention of falls is cited as one of the
43. Lord & Clark, supra note 1, at 199.
44. Id. at 199, 202.
45. Braun & Capezuti, supra note 7, at 239.
46. Braun & Capezuti, supra note 2, at 1.
47. Id. at 1. They define physical restraints as any manual method or any
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principal reasons for using restraints in nursing home settings,
with a strong reference to liability control."8 Yet they argue that
such strategies do not accomplish the objective of either
preventing falls or litigation and that studies indicate that the
rates of injury from falls are higher at institutions using
restraints. One half of all fall-related injuries are by those who
are restrained.49  Braun and Capezuti suggest that one can
design risk-management strategies that reduce liability
exposure, utilizing individualized assessment of fall risk of
nursing home clients.
The issue of restraints has been the subject of considerable
scholarly commentary involving both medical and legal
considerations. At the heart of these debates is whether restraint
measures prevent falls and subsequent hip and other fractures
and injuries. Braun and Capezuti report that in countries such
as Sweden and Scotland, restraints are rarely used, yet the
incidence of fall injuries in nursing home settings is no higher
than those countries where such restraints are regularly
utilized. 0 They cite a series of studies that indicate that use of
restraints does not reduce the overall incidence of injurious falls,
and suggest that this is a key to developing new prevention
policies.
THE EFFECTS OF LIABILITY REGIMES ON INSTITUTIONAL CARE
DECISIONS
Doctors and other front line health care practitioners are
influenced by liability chill and public policy choices about
health care. More prevalent in the United States, tort scholars
argue that there is a connection between prevention of future
injuries and compensation of injured individuals. The classical
law and economics argument is that the tort system reflects a
trade off between the costs of prevention of harm and costs of
avoidable harm in the form of compensation for hip fractures.
Where the costs of compensation for avoidable hip fractures
physical or mechanical device, material or equipment attached to or adjacent to the
persons body, that she or he cannot easily remove and which restricts freedom of
movement or the normal access to one's body, drawn from the U.S. DEPT. OF HUMAN
AND HEALTH SERVICES (1995).
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 2, citing generally Gerard S. Brungardt, Patient Restraints: New
Guidelines for a Less Restrictive Approach, 49 GERIATRICS 43 (1994).
50. Id. at 11.
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exceed the costs of prevention, decision makers will shift their
strategy towards a risk prevention one in order to save costs.
However, this assumes that the costs are fully recognized and
accounted for in the tort system, an assumption that does not
appear to have been established. As noted above, the incidence
of hip fractures may be documented but the costs to the
economic, social, and well-being of individuals are externalities
that are often not accounted for in the tort liability regime. Thus,
incentives to reduce the risk of hip fractures are not created by
the tort or statutory liability regime, although the regime does
appear to have some small incentive effect.
Scholars have argued that the risk of lawsuits has incentive
effects on medical practice, but the effects are less than ideal.
Therefore, they argue, it may be that there should be greater
focus on the institution creating the incentives for reduced risk,
with the institutional caregiver rather than the individual health
caregiver bearing the tort costs as one means of creating
incentives to reduce health risks." Furrow observes that the
more colleague-dependent the medical or health practice
becomes the greater likelihood for self-imposed peer review and
higher quality care. 52 Furrow suggests that tort law is generally
an economic and behavioural mechanism, whereby the rule of
liability substitutes for regulation of the quality of health care.
He suggests that it provides health care practitioners with
incentives to reduce injury and medical error, since patients lack
the information to monitor the quality of care themselves. In
turn, the economic model of liability seeks an optimal
prevention policy, one that minimizes the total cost associated
with injuries, including resource costs of injuries, costs of
prevention, administrative costs of compensation, and the cost
of insurance.53 While Furrow believes that the tort system does
create some incentive effects, threats of tort suits are only one
factor of many that create incentives in medical practice and that
the link between medical error and tort culpability is complex
and imperfect. 4 Furrow also observes that the tort regime filters
out the poor who do not have the information or resources to
51. See, e.g., Barry Furrow, The Legal Implications of Health Care Cost Containment:
Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment, Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE WESTERN L.
REV. 985, 985 (1986).
52. Id. at 989.
53. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, (1970), cited id. at 991.
54. Id. at 1003.
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pursue claims. He argues for an institutional liability regime,
where hospitals and other facilities acquire direct liability as
opposed to the current vicarious liability, creating greater
structural and centralized incentives to change practices to
reduce risks.55
LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION OF HIP FRACTURES: A
RESEARCH AGENDA
Many prevention strategies for falls are available, for example,
physical aids such as grab bars and non-skid mats. Some
strategies enhance prevention and protection but raise issues of
self-dignity or independence. One example is hip pads, which
raise the question of prevention versus self-image. Another is
implants, raising a host of new issues regarding prevention, the
scope of medical intrusion and loss of self-dignity. Prevention
options are driven in part by costs, including legal liability
issues, and the autonomy and dignity of those at risk. Health
care professionals can (should) educate family members about
all prevention strategies, including lighting, cluttered rooms and
passageways, wet or polished floors, nutrition, ongoing
preventive health care, and a host of other factors that can
prevent falls.56 As noted in the introduction, this brief article
does not propose new legal strategies for prevention of hip
fractures. Considerably more empirical study is required,
particularly in terms of assessing other systems internationally
to explore different kinds of models and the potential for truly
creating ex ante incentives to reduce hip fractures. However,
some initial questions can be raised, that may set the stage for
identifying further collaborative research possibilities. Any
future research agenda regarding legal incentives must be
undertaken in conjunction with health care strategies, given that
they are integrally inter-related.
WHAT ROLE OUGHT LEGAL SYSTEMS TO PLAY IN PROMOTING MORE
SYSTEMIC APPROACHES TO PREVENTION OF HIP FRACTURES?
Numerous scholars have explored issues of liability,
55. Id. at 1013-14.
56. Rosalie Guttman et al, Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs: Use of
Restraints for Patients in Nursing Homes, 8 ARCHIVE FAMILY MEDICINE 101, 105 (1999).
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insurance and compensation in health care.57 While successful
medical injury and malpractice suits are considerably fewer in
Canada, they do pose many of the challenges described above
and may act to chill more creative thinking on prevention of hip
fractures and other health outcomes. The issue is whether the
tort system really has a deterrent effect on medical and health
practice. In particular, scholars have questioned whether it does
encourage optimal or appropriate levels of health care, and have
argued that there is an absence of evidence that tort law has a
positive impact on the quality of care.58 Similarly, one can
speculate on whether tort law and statutory liability for the
elderly has either deterrent effects in the sense of removing
physical and other risks of falls or particular incentive effects in
not encouraging a system focused on prevention.
In the context of medical malpractice, Weiler has suggested
that tort law rests on the notion that imposing liability on those
at fault in prior accidents will induce similarly situated
individuals to avoid such culpably risky behaviour in the future,
but that it is difficult to establish how much of an incentive effect
is created and whether it materially reduces injuries to potential
victims." Elgie et al suggest that it may be more effective just to
offer lower but adequate levels of compensation to a broad
group of those harmed than to provide a small minority of
people access to a generous award.60 They use the Swedish no
fault medical misadventure system as an illustration of how this
could be accomplished, arguing that there may be increased
efficiencies because establishing causation is easier than
establishing fault. There may be savings resulting from a
reduction in practicing defensive medicine, and their may be
reduced rates of injury because of improved quality assurance
57. See, e.g., J.R.S. PRICHARD, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN HEALTH CARE,
at 50-56 (University of Toronto Press 1990); Michael Trebilcock, The Social
Insurance/Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian
Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929, 931 (1987);
Bernard Dickens, The Effects of Legal Liability on Physicians' Services, 41 U. TORONTO
L.J. 168, 168-172 (1991).
58. Robert Elgie, Timothy Caulfield & Michael Christie, Medical Injuries and
Malpractice: Is It Time for No-Fault?, 1 HEALTH L.J. 97, 98 (1993), discuss this in the
context of medical malpractice and iatrogenic injuries (adverse condition of a
patient occurring as a result of treatment by a physician).
59. PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 72-73 (Harvard University
Press 1991).
60. Elgie et al, supra note 58, at 102.
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programs.61 Further comparative study is required in order to
determine the role that legal systems should play in promoting
systemic approaches to prevention of hip fractures.
SHOULD WE MOVE TO A SYSTEM OF NO FAULT COMPENSATION FOR
HIP FRACTURES?
Scholars examining tort liability in the medical malpractice
area have suggested that perhaps it is timely to consider a no-
fault system for medical injuries. In the context of hip fractures,
perhaps it is time to think about more systemic prevention
strategies. This entails future thinking about two aspects. First,
do we need to attribute personal or institutional liability to
individuals so that decisions about standards of facilities,
staffing ratios and other caregiving choices really do work to
prevent hip fractures? The argument in favour is that
individuals make choices, particularly about the amount of
resources to be expended on making places safe or caring for
older people and that absent some incentive system, individuals
will externalize the costs of falls and hip fractures to the elderly.
Intuitively, there is some merit to this argument, although as
Weiler noted above62 , it is premised somewhat on the idea that
others will note and take into account the liability findings
against other individuals.
Another approach is to maintain liability, but attribute it to
the institution, with some sort of experience rating in the
premium costs of compensation coverage. This is not unlike the
workers' compensation system in Canada. That system
ostensibly provides global insurance for workers, and while they
are required to establish a causal link between their injury and
the employer, the compensation comes from pooled resources
drawn from industries, pegged to the amount of prevention or
injury that the industry has experienced. Workers arguably
have an easier ability to establish claims and receive
compensation, and employers avoid the risk of the full liability
regime and its attendant costs. 63 A similar system for the elderly
and hip fractures is possible, but unlike workers' compensation,
the sources of the falls are complex and diverse. It is unclear
61. Id. at 103, 114-115.
62. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
63. This assertion could be highly contestable with recent changes to workers'
compensation regimes that disadvantage worker claimants.
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that an appropriate liability regime could be easily fashioned.
Establishing fault or a breach of duty of care is a major barrier to
compensation under the tort regime.
It may be more realistic to simply adjust the tax base to
ensure that there are sufficient resources to support elderly
individuals, to provide comprehensive income support systems,
proper home care and health care supports, and funding of other
preventive strategies, and move away from the liability regime
entirely. Egregious cases of creating risks of falls could still be
dealt with by the criminal justice system, but the costly and
ineffective tort regime would not be utilized as a prevention
strategy. If the costs to the system from falls and hip fractures
were the same, the costs of this harm would be redistributed,
with those injured bearing a smaller percentage of the costs.
There also may be fewer losses to elderly individuals in terms of
the quality of their lives and their morbidity and mortality rates.
If the actual harms from falls and hip fractures were reduced
because adequate structural funding and incentives were in
place at the front end of the process, then the cost saving could
be enormous, and more importantly, the quality of life for those
at risk of these falls would be considerably enhanced. These are
questions that require further study.
Neil Komesar, Larry Palmer and others have observed that
modifying the tort liability system will not actively promote
safety as the principal public policy objective." Rather, the goal
of safety and prevention of injury must first be established as a
primary public policy objective and then multiple legal and non-
legal vehicles such as the tort liability system, regulation of
standards, and market pressures used to achieve these goals.
Public health measures, which are optimally aimed at the
prevention aspect of health care, are funded through legislative
and regulatory initiatives, and it is here that the law directly
influences prevention of injury.65
64. Larry Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction and the Law, 36 HOUsTON L. REV.
1609, 1613 (1999).
65. Id. at 1626.
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DOES THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY AND NEGOTIATED RISK
PRESENT A POSSIBILITY FOR REDUCED HIP FRACTURES?
Although beyond the scope of this article, another
possibility, which was suggested by Marshall Kapp and other
scholars, is the notion of "negotiated risk." Earlier work by Kapp
and Karen Brown Wilson tracks the evolution of assisted living
and important questions of autonomy for individuals, liability
fear on the part of health and daily care providers, and the
tension between safety and independent decision making for
older individuals.6 6 Kapp and Brown Wilson observe that the
shift in types of living and care arrangements necessitates a
more fulsome consideration of how to reconcile these tensions.
They suggest that the negotiated risk concept builds on the
informed consent doctrine, by using the individual's
autonomous right to make decisions about his or her own care
plan to clarify and reallocate the risks and responsibilities
associated with the choices made.67 Kapp and Brown Wilson
make an important observation that there needs to be a
paradigm shift away from liability considerations and risk
avoidance at the cost of client autonomy.68 It would appear that
a discussion of prevention of fall and hip fractures falls squarely
within this issue, particularly given some of the factors
identified at the outset as risk factors for fractures.
The issue of negotiated risk does require careful
consideration. A key issue is how one defines assumption of
risk and how one creates incentives in the system that would
obviate the need for threat of tort liability. While negotiated risk
presumably reallocates responsibility between the parties rather
than removing responsibility from caregivers, there is a question
of how one can ensure that new incentives are not created to
shift all of the risks onto the individual. The same factors that
create barriers for the elderly in tort and statutory claims for
injury, lack of information, resources, difficulty in establishing
the duty of care was breached, and willing assumption of risk,
are all factors that come into play in a discussion of a negotiated
risk paradigm. Kapp and Brown Wilson note the imbalance in
66. See generally Marshall B. Kapp & Karen Brown Wilson, Assisted Living and
Negotiated Risk: Reconciling Protection and Autonomy, 1 JOURNAL OF ETHICS, LAW AND
AGING 5 (1995).
67. Id. at 9.
68. Kapp & Brown Wilson, supra note 66, at 8.
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bargaining power given the vulnerability of older individuals
and the need for advocacy to redress any imbalance. Jocelyn
Downie has observed that even where individuals appear to be
engaged in contractual or consensus decisions, there are
powerful underlying notions of deferring to doctors and other
health care professionals that should be addressed. 9 Furrow has
cautioned that the use of informed consent in a cost-containment
health environment poses the risk of converting medical
decisions into economic decision-making, and that this may be a
variation on the "blaming the victim".7 There are numerous
questions for future exploration arising from this model of fall
prevention.
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON CREATING
INCENTIVES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO REDUCE THE INCIDENCE OF
HIP FRACTURES
What kind of further empirical research is needed to
determine legal incentives to prevent falls and hip fractures and
other injuries? A starting list might include the following:
* How can we shift the legal system to proactively
promote safety and falls prevention as opposed to
creating only deterrent effects from ex post
compensation for injury?
* To what extent does liability chill differ in Canada
from the United States, and how does this affect risk of
falls in institutional care and assisted living settings?
* How can the legislative system ameliorate the
financial position of the elderly, such that it moves from
a harm/compensation paradigm to one that promotes
risk reduction, economic security and prevention of
injury from falls?
* What is the interaction of the legal system with
market incentives to prevent falls?
* What are the downside risks of the concept of
negotiated risk and how can the legal system reduce the
inequality of bargaining power and information in
69. JOCELYN DOWNIE, RESCUING RESEARCH THROUGH REGULATION,
presentation to Canadian Association of Law Teachers, (June 1, 2003), Halifax,
Nova Scotia.
70. Furrow, supra note 51, at 1017.
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trying to optimize outcomes?
* Are there dispute resolution techniques that may
have a natural application in resolving disputes about
safety prior to falls or disputes about cause after injuries
occur?
* How can legal resources be redirected to provide
more structural support to the elderly, including acting
in an advocacy capacity to promote public health
initiatives, education and to monitor the regulatory
standards that do exist for prevention of falls?
As noted in the introduction, there are 1.6 million hip
fractures among citizens aged sixty or older each year. This
article has explored the extent to which the legal system
currently creates ex ante incentives that both contribute to and
prevent the incidence of falls and hip fractures. It has also
highlighted the limits of the current liability regime. The current
system's disjunction with prevention goals means that
considerably more empirical research and public policy
development is required before we are to truly devise a regime
aimed at minimizing harms to elderly citizens as a result of falls.
Any further design of legal incentives for prevention of hip
fractures must complement health and socio-economic policy
instruments aimed at preventive strategies.
171

